Abstract. In many security protocols, such as group protocols, principals have to perform iterative or recursive computations. We call such protocols recursive protocols. Recently, first results on the decidability of the security of such protocols have been obtained. While recursive protocols often employ operators with algebraic, security relevant properties, such as the exclusive OR (XOR), the existing decision procedures, however, cannot deal with such operators and their properties. In this paper, we show that the security of recursive protocols with XOR is decidable (w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions) for a class of protocols in which recursive computations of principals are modeled by certain Horn theories. Interestingly, this result can be obtained by a reduction to the case without XOR. We also show that relaxing certain assumptions of our model lead to undecidability.
Introduction
In group protocols and other classes of security protocols a protocol step performed by a principal (i.e., receiving a message and then sending a message) typically involves recursive or iterative computation. We will refer to such protocols by recursive protocols, in contrast to non-recursive protocols where the computation performed in one protocol step is simple and does not require recursion. Many, in fact, most of the recursive protocols proposed in the literature employ operators, such as Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and exclusive OR (XOR), which have algebraic, security relevant properties (see, e.g., [11, 12, 7] ). The present work is concerned with the automatic security analysis of such protocols. While recently first results on the decidability of the security (more precisely, the secrecy property) of recursive protocols have been obtained [8, 9, 14] , these results do not take into account operators with algebraic properties (see also the related work).
The attacks on recursive protocols presented in the literature illustrate that dealing with algebraic properties of operators is security relevant (see, e.g., [11, 12, 7] ). One example is the Recursive Authentication (RA) protocol proposed by Bull and Otway [1] . In this protocol, a key distribution server receives a list of (arbitrary many) requests of pairs of principals who want to establish session keys among them. The server processes this list iteratively, generates the session keys, and then distributes them. In [10] , Paulson proved that the RA protocol is secure under the assumption that session keys are distributed using (ideally) secure encryption. However, Ryan and Schneider [12] showed that there is an attack on the protocol if XOR is used to distribute keys, which in fact was the original proposition by Bull and Otway: In the attack by Ryan and Schneider, the adversary is given one session key generated by the server and using this key he can obtain all other session keys by chaining messages via XOR.
Contribution of this work. In this paper, we extend the model for recursive protocols proposed in [14] , henceforth called the Horn theory model, by adding XOR (along with its algebraic properties). In the Horn theory model, recursive/iterative computations performed by principals in one protocol step are modeled by certain Horn theories, hence the name. While in models for nonrecursive protocols XOR can be added without losing decidability of security (w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions) [2, 6] -security even remains NP-complete just as in the case without XOR [2] -for recursive protocols things are more involved. We show that a naïve extension of the Horn theory model by XOR leads to undecidability of security. (As a byproduct we also obtain undecidability in case complex keys are used in the Horn theory model, a fact that has not been observed before.) More precisely, we obtain undecidability in case principals may conjoin arbitrary messages received from the network by XOR. Conversely, we show decidability in case principals may only conjoin a fixed message, i.e., a message that does not depend on messages received from the network, with a message that depends on messages received from the network. We call protocols which only contain such principals ⊕-linear. From a practical point of view, ⊕-linear protocols are sufficient in many cases, e.g., for the RA protocol and other protocols [12, 2, 7] . We emphasize that we do not constrain the intruder in its ability to conjoin messages by XOR.
The technique used to obtained decidability is very different to the one in [14] . In fact, the main part of our proof is to reduce the security problem in the Horn theory model with XOR to the one without XOR. More precisely, we first prove certain properties of attacks involving XOR. Based on these properties we then reduce the security problem to the case without XOR, which by [14] is decidable. In the reduction we use the ability of principals to perform recursive computations in order to mimic applications of the XOR operator.
Further Related Work. For non-recursive protocols decidability of security (w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions) was shown for several operators with algebraic properties, e.g., XOR [2, 6] , Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation [3, 13] , and commuting public-key encryption [4] . However, the models employed in these works cannot handle recursive computations of principals, such as the computation of the server in the RA protocol. The techniques differ as well: Due to the absence of recursive computations, the reduction technique developed in the present work is not applicable in these models. Conversely, the techniques for bounding the size of attacks and the constraint solving techniques employed in [2, 6, 3, 13, 4] cannot immediately be applied to recursive protocols.
In [8, 9] , transducers were used to model recursive computations of principals. The expressivity of these transducer-based models is orthogonal to the Horn theory model: While the transducer-based models allow to output messages of complex structure, in the Horn theory model only lists (or sets) of messages of a more simple structure can be produced. The main disadvantage of the transducer-based model is that, unlike the Horn theory model, messages cannot be tested for equality without losing decidability. This, as already observed in [9] , immediately implies that security is undecidable in the transducer-based model with XOR (or Diffie-Hellman exponentiation) since these operators allow for (implicit) equality tests between arbitrary messages. In the transducer-based model, even one equality test (or alternatively, one application of the XOR operator) suffices for the undecidability.
Horn theories have also been used for the automatic analysis of non-recursive protocols (see, e.g., [5, 15] and references therein). The results and techniques employed in these works are very different to the ones presented here: The main goal of these works, which also consider operators with algebraic properties, is automatic protocol analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions, where, however, the intruder knowledge is over-approximated.
Structure of the paper. In the following section, we present our protocol and intruder model, with an example presented in Section 3. The undecidability and decidability results are stated in Section 4 and 5, respectively. We conclude in Section 6. The appendix provides further details and proofs.
The Protocol and Intruder Model
In this section, we introduce our protocol and intruder model, including messages, principals, protocols, and attacks, along the lines of [14] where, unlike the model in [14] , here messages may contain the exclusive OR (XOR).
Horn theories. Let Σ be a finite signature, V be a set of variables, and T denote the set of terms over Σ and V . Ground terms are terms without variables. Substitutions are defined as usual. The application of a substitution σ to a term t is denoted by tσ. Substitutions are defined on sets of terms and atoms (see below) in the obvious way. For a unary predicate q and a (ground) term t ∈ T we call q(t) a (ground) atom. For a set S of terms we write q(S) for the set {q(s) | s ∈ S} of atoms. Let ∼ be a congruence relation over T . We write q(t) ∼ q (t ) if q = q and t ∼ t . A (unary) Horn theory T is a finite set of Horn clauses of the form a 1 , . . . , a n ⇒ a 0 with atoms a i for every i. Given a set of ground atoms A and a ground atom a, we say that a can be derived from A w.r.t. T (written A T a) if there exists a derivation for a from A using T , i.e., there exists a sequence b 1 , . . . , b l of ground atoms such that b l ∼ a and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we either have b i ∈ A or there exists a substitution σ and a Horn clause a 1 , . . . , a n ⇒ a 0 in T such that a 0 σ ∼ b i and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} with a j σ ∼ b k .
Messages. Let A be a finite set of constants (also called atomic messages), such as principal names, nonces, and keys, and let K be a subset of A (the set of keys). We assume that 0, Sec ∈ A and that there is a bijection · −1 on K which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private (public) key k −1 . Let Σ A (or simply Σ) be a finite signature consisting of all constants from A, the unary function symbol hash(·) (hashing), and the following binary function symbols: ·, · (pairing), {·} · (symmetric encryption), {|·| } · (public key encryption), and ⊕ (exclusive OR).
The set of terms over Σ and V is defined by the following grammar:
Note that we assume atomic keys, i.e., keys used to encrypt messages are required to be constants. We denote by Var(t) the set of variables occurring in t.
Ground terms, i.e., terms without variables are called messages. To model the algebraic properties of XOR, we consider the congruence relation ∼ on T induced by the following equational theory:
For example, we have that a⊕b⊕{|0| } k ⊕b⊕{|c ⊕ c| } k ∼ a. (Due to the associativity of ⊕ we often omit brackets and simply write a ⊕ b ⊕ c instead of
Principals and Protocols. A protocol step consists of a protocol rule and a send program. A protocol rule is of the form t → q(s) where t, s ∈ T and q is some unary predicate symbol. A send program Φ is a unary Horn theory where every Horn clause is of one of the following forms:
where q , q , q are arbitrary (not necessarily different) unary predicate symbols, t is a linear term (i.e., every variable in t occurs at most once) which does not contain the symbol ⊕ and I is a distinguished unary predicate symbol, which will model the network, and hence, the intruder; the terms s and s may be non-linear and may contain ⊕. Intuitively, clauses of the form (1), called push clauses, allow a principal to recursively traverse a term from top to bottom (e.g., process a list). Clauses of the form (2), called send clauses, are used by a principal to perform checks on messages (by matching them against s) and to output messages on the network, as will be clearer from the following definition: For a ground atom q(m), we define the set of terms sent using Φ by
Now, the intuition behind a protocol step which consists of a protocol rule t → q(s) and a send program Φ is that a principal, after having received a term tθ, for some ground substitution θ, sends all the terms from the set q(sθ) Φ on the network, i.e., to the intruder, by running the send program Φ.
The decidability result in [14] in the Horn theory model without XOR works if t in (1) is flat, i.e., is of the form t = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where the variables x i are not required to be different. We could also allow such terms in (1). However, (complex) linear terms are better suited for modeling protocols. It is easy to see that linear terms in (1) can be turned into flat form by using auxiliary predicate symbols.
A principal Π is a finite edge-labeled tree where every edge is labeled by a protocol step. If the protocol rule of a protocol step is of the form t → q(s), we require that every variable occurring in s also occurs in t or the left-hand side of a protocol rule preceding t → q(s) in the tree Π. We also assume, w.l.o.g., that the set of predicates used in send programs of different protocol steps are pairwise disjoint, except that I may be used in all of the send programs. The intuition is that if a principal waits at a node of the tree and receives a message, then she can apply one of the protocol steps whose left-hand side (i.e., the left-hand side of the corresponding protocol rule) matches with the incoming message, and after having run the corresponding send program, moves to the next node.
For a principal Π we call a sequence π of protocol steps a run of Π if π is a sequence of protocol steps obtained when traversing Π from the root to some node of Π (not necessarily a leaf).
A protocol P is a tuple (Π 1 , . . . , Π l ) of principals Π i . We assume, w.l.o.g., that the set of variables of protocol rules of different principals are disjoint.
Attack. The intruder is the standard Dolev-Yao intruder extended by the ability to apply the XOR operator [6, 2] . Formally, the intruder is modeled by the following Horn theory T ⊕ where k ∈ K and x, y ∈ V , x = y:
Given a protocol P = (Π 1 , . . . , Π l ), a protocol execution scheme of P is a sequence of protocol steps π = π 1 , . . . , π n such that each π i can be assigned to one of the principals Π 1 , . . . , Π l and such that, for every i, the subsequence of elements of π assigned to Π i is a run of Π i , i.e., π is an interleaving of runs of the Π i . Now, an attack on P is a pair (π, θ) where
is a protocol execution scheme of P and θ is a ground substitution of the variables in Var({t 1 , s 1 , . . . , t n , s n }) such that
where Φ = n i=1 Φ i (recall that different send programs use disjoint sets of predicates, except that they all may use I ). Condition (3) says that in every step of the protocol execution the intruder is able to derive the message expected by the respective principal and (4) says that at the end he is able to derive the secret Sec. Note that, w.l.o.g., initially the intruder only knows the constant 0: One can define a designated principal that expects to receive 0 and in return outputs messages the intruder is allowed to know, e.g., public keys. A protocol is called insecure if there exists an attack on it. Let Attack general = {P | P is an insecure protocol} denote the corresponding decision problem.
An Example Protocol
To illustrate our model, we present a formal description of the Recursive Authentication (RA) Protocol [1] . In what follows, we abbreviate messages of the form m 0 , . . . , m n−1 , m n · · · by m 0 , . . . , m n and messages of the form m, hash( k, m ) , i.e., a message m along with a keyed hash on m, by hash k (m).
The key distribution server S of the RA protocol shares a long-term (symmetric) key with every principal and performs only one (recursive) protocol step in a protocol run. In this protocol step, S receives an a priori unbounded sequence of requests of pairs of principals who want to obtain session keys for secure communication and then generates so-called certificates which contain the session keys. An example of the kind of message S receives is
where N c , N b , and N a are nonces generated by C, B, and A, respectively, and K c , K b , and K a are the long-term keys shared between the server S and the principals C, B, and A, respectively. Recall that, for instance, hash Ka (A, B, N a , −) stands for the message A, B, N a , − , hash( K a , A, B, N a , − ) . Message (5) consists of three requests and indicates that C wants to share a session key with S, B with C, and A with B. The constant "−" marks the end of the sequence of requests. We emphasize that messages sent to S may contain an arbitrary number of requests-which must be processed by S recursively. Now, given message (5), S processes the requests starting from the outermost. First, S generates two certificates for C, namely, C, S, K cs ⊕ hash Kc (N c ), {C, S, N c } Kcs and C, B, K bc ⊕ hash Kc (N c ), {C, B, N c } K bc (from these certificates C can easily deduce K cs and K bc and check whether the encrypted messages have the expected form). In the same way, certificates for B and A are generated, where A only obtains one certificate (containing the session key for communication with B).
Formally, the protocol step performed by S is as follows, where we assume that P 0 , . . . , P n are the principals that may participate in the RA protocol, with P n = S, and every P i , i < n, shares a long-term key K i with S: The protocol rule of S is simply x → q(x) and the send program consists of the following Horn clauses, where j ≤ n and i, i < n:
where
The server would also check whether the first request is addressed to it. This can easily be captured by using another predicate; however, for simplicity of presentation this is not modeled here. The model of the principals P 0 , . . . , P n−1 of the RA protocol is rather standard as they do not need to perform recursive computations. We therefore omit their formal specification here.
Undecidability of the General Case
We prove the following theorem:
Proof. The proof is by reduction from Post Correspondence Problem (PCP): An instance I of PCP is a non-empty sequence
To encode I, let A I = A ∪ {⊥, 1, . . . , n, k, −} denote the set of atomic messages that we use. For a word u ∈ A * I and a term t over A I , we define t · u inductively by t · u = t if u = ε and t · u = t, a · v with u = av for some a ∈ A I and v ∈ A * I . A solution of I is encoded by what we call a solution sequence of I. A solution sequence of I is a sequence t 0 , . . . , t l of messages using constants in A I where t 0 = ⊥, ⊥ , t l = m, m for some message m over A I , and for every i ∈ {0, . .
It is easy to see that a PCP instance I has a solution iff there is a solution sequence for I.
Given I, we reduce checking whether I has a solution to checking whether there exists an attack on the protocol P I : P I consists of one principal only and this principal performs only one protocol step where the protocol rule of this step is simply x → q(x) and the idea behind the send program is that it expects to receive a solution sequence t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t l−1 , t l , − · · · and does the following, where − marks the end of the sequence and M i = t i , . . . , t l−1 , t l , − · · · (see Appendix A for the formal definition of the send program):
For every i ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}, if t i is of the form x, y and t i+1 is of the form
3. If t l is of the form x, x , then {M l } k ⊕ Sec is sent to the intruder. Now, it is easy to see that if the intruder is able to send a solution sequence to the principal (which is the case if such a sequence exists), then by chaining all messages received from the principal via XOR, the intruder obtains Sec. Conversely, if the intruder cannot send a solution sequence (since no such sequence exists), he will not obtain Sec since at least one "link" in the chain will be missing.
A similar reduction as the one presented above also works if XOR is replaced by symmetric encryption where keys may be arbitrary messages (complex keys). Hence, we also obtain the following theorem, where Attack compkey is the security problem in our model with complex keys (and without XOR).
Theorem 2.
The problem Attack compkey is undecidable.
Decidability of ⊕-linear Protocols
In the proof of undecidability (Theorem 1) we used that a principal may conjoin two messages by XOR where both messages may depend on messages received from the network. In ⊕-linear protocols, defined next, this is forbidden. In this section, we show that the existence of attacks can be decided for ⊕-linear protocols. A protocol P is ⊕-linear if for each subterm of the form t ⊕ s occurring in P (both in protocol rules and in send programs), t or s is ground. For example, if the term (x⊕a)⊕y with a ∈ A, x, y ∈ V occurs in P , then P is not ⊕-linear. The RA protocol (Section 3) is an example of an ⊕-linear protocol; see, e.g., [2] for another example. Let Attack ⊕−linear = {P | P is an ⊕-linear, insecure protocol}.
The main result of this paper is:
Before we provide a sketch of a proof of this theorem, we note that our result extends the decidability results presented in [6, 2] for non-recursive protocols to recursive protocols, in case the protocols are ⊕-linear and restricted to atomic keys. In the remainder of this section we only sketch main ideas of the proof of Theorem 3, while the full proof is given in Appendix B.
The proof consists of two main steps: First, we prove certain properties of derivations in the Horn theory model with XOR (Section 5.1). Based on these properties we then reduce the security problem to the case without XOR, which by [14] is decidable. In the reduction we use the ability of principals to perform recursive computations in order to mimic operations involving XOR. The reduction is sketched in Section 5.2. An initial (minor) step, not further discussed in this section, is to turn a protocol into simple form. This is used to combine all derivations carried out in (3) and (4) into a single derivation from I(0) to I (Sec). So, we may consider an attack as a single derivation, called attack derivation (see Appendix B.1 for details).
for n > 1, where the terms t1, . . . , tn are pairwise distinct and c ∼ c0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cn (10)
Fig. 1. ⊕-Rules in Modest Derivations

Good Derivations
In this section, we identify and analyze properties of attack derivations. First, we need to introduce some notation and terminology. We call a term standard if its top-symbol is not ⊕; otherwise, it is called non-standard. For a protocol P , let S P denote the set of all the ground subterms of terms occurring in P and let C P be the set consisting of all terms of the form t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n with t i ∈ S P modulo ∼. Elements of C P are referred to by c and decorations thereof. In what follows, non-standard terms will be written as c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n where c stands for a (ground) term in C P and t 1 , . . . , t n are standard terms not in C P . A term is C P -long (or just long, if C P is known from the context) if it is of the form c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n , for n > 1. Otherwise it is called C P -short (or just short).
We now introduce what we call modest and normal derivations and prove properties about them.
A derivation is modest if it uses the rules depicted in Figure 1 instead of I (x), I (y) → I (x ⊕ y) where c, c 0 , . . . , c n ∈ C P and t, t , t 1 , . . . , t n are standard ground terms not in C P ; s and s are arbitrary ground terms. We observe that in a modest derivation long terms may only be used to obtain an element of C P , by applying rule (6) . In all other rules ( (7)- (10)), only short terms may be conjoined by XOR. However, (10) , which allows to combine an unbounded number of short terms, may produce a long term.
The next lemma states that it is enough to consider modest derivations. Therefore, in the remainder of this section we will assume derivations to be modest.
Lemma 1. If there exists an attack on P , then this attack can be proven by a modest derivation.
We now introduce normal derivations. In a normal derivation, applications of certain classes of rules are grouped into segments and segments occur in a certain order. In this extended abstract, we will only define some aspects of normal derivations (see the appendix for a full definition).
If
. . , b j for i ≤ j is a subsequence of the derivation. A segment of a derivation is a maximal subsequence which does not contain any atom of the form I (c), for some c ∈ C P , or any atom obtained by a protocol rule.
Rule (8) Because the cardinality of the set C P is exponentially bounded w.r.t. the size of P , the number of segments in an attack derivation is also exponentially bounded in the size of P . Now, as a result of Lemma 2 and the definition of normal derivations we obtain:
Lemma 3. In a modest and normal attack derivation the number of variant segments is exponentially bounded in the size of the protocol.
We now show that the number of long terms can be bounded in attack derivations. The key is the notion of a profile of a standard term. A profile α is defined w.r.t. an attack derivation δ and consists of an element c in C P and a natural number k. Roughly speaking, two standard ground terms satisfy the same profile if they behave similarly w.r.t. c in the k-th segment of δ. In particular, if two terms have the same profile, each of them can be used instead of the other one when long terms are constructed by Rule (10) . So, for a given derivation δ and a profile α, we will fix a term t δ α and use it whenever a term of profile α is used to build a long term.
If c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t k , for k > 1, is a long term, the positions where t 1 , . . . , t n occur are called unimportant. We can show the following lemma: Lemma 4. If there exists an attack on a protocol, then there exists a normal attack derivation δ for this protocol such that whenever terms t, t of the same profile α occur in δ at unimportant positions, then t = t .
We call derivations of the form described in Lemma 4 good. Now, from the definition of profiles it immediately follows that the number of different profiles is (exponentially) bounded in the size of the protocol. Together with Lemma 4 we obtain: Corollary 1. If a term c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n occurs in a good attack derivation, then n is bounded exponentially in the size of the protocol. Furthermore, in a good attack derivation for a protocol, the number of distinct terms of the form c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n , for n > 1, is bounded by some (computable) number M in the size of the protocol.
Reduction to the ⊕-Free Case
We now show how the security problem can be reduced to the ⊕-free case, i.e., given a protocol P we construct a protocol P + which does not contain ⊕ such that there exists an attack on P (in the sense defined in Section 2) iff there exists an attack on P + in the ⊕-free setting. The main steps are i) to represent terms with ⊕ by ⊕-free terms and ii) to mimic intruder rules involving ⊕ in the ⊕-free setting.
For
We also substitute every c ∈ C P by the constant [c] .
Now, we turn to intruder rules involving ⊕ and show how they can be mimiced in the ⊕-free setting. By the results of Section 5.1, we may assume that attack derivations are modest, normal, and good. In particular, by Lemma 1, it suffices to mimic rules (6) to (10):
-Rule (7) and (9): These rules can easily be mimiced by ordinary intruder rules (decryption and encryption). Consider, for instance, rule (7): In the original attack atoms I (c ⊕ t) and I (c) are used to obtain I (t). Now,
by the standard decryption rule. -Rule (6): The result of this rule is of the form I (c) with c ∈ C P . Because there is a bounded number, say L, of elements in C P , we can mimic this rule by adding L principals to P each with a single protocol step of the form
The result of this rule is a long term and we know, by Corollary 1, that the number of such terms is bounded by a constant M which only depends on the size of the protocol, so, again, we can handle this case by adding a bounded number of principals each with a single protocol step of the form
-Rule (8): By Lemma 3, we know that the number of variant segments (i.e., blocks of atoms obtained by the variant rule) is bounded by a number N depending only on the protocols size and that no element obtained by a variant rule is necessary as a premise of a variant rule in the same variant segment. Hence, each of these variant segments can be handled by a protocol step of the following form:
with the following send program:
for c, c ∈ CP
More details on the construction of P + can be found in the appendix. We can show:
Lemma 5. For an ⊕-linear protocol P we have that there exists an attack on P (in the sense of Section 2) if and only if there exists an attack on P + in the ⊕-free setting.
Since the security of P + is decidable [14] and P + can effectively be computed from P , Theorem 3 follows. A more careful analysis of the complexity of our construction reveals that the size of P + is double exponential in the size of P . As the secrecy of P + can be decide in NexpTime [14] , we obtain an 3-NexpTime upper bound. Nonetheless, we believe that this upper bound can be reduced to NexpTime by a more careful construction and a refinement of the proof in [14] .
Conclusion
In this work, we have proved that security (w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions) is decidable for the class of ⊕-linear protocols. This is the first decidability result for recursive protocols involving algebraic properties of operators. We have also shown that relaxing certain assumptions of our model lead to undecidability of security. Our decidability result was obtained in a modular way by first reducing the problem of deciding security in the Horn theory model with XOR to the one without XOR and then using the existing decidability result for the latter model. We expect that the modular proof technique developed in this paper also helps to deal with other operators, such as Diffie-Hellman exponentiation.
A The Send Program in the Proof of Theorem 1
The send program in the proof of Theorem 1 is defined as follows, where j ranges over {1, . . . , n}:
with
It is straightforward to check that Sec can only be derived by the intruder if a solution sequence is given as input to the send program.
B Proof of Theorem 3
While the key ideas of the proof of Theorem 3 were given in Section 5, now we provide the details of the proof. First, in Section B.1, we show how to turn a protocol into simple form. This is used to combine all derivations carried out in (3) and (4) into a single derivation from I(0) to I (Sec). So, we may consider an attack as a single derivation, called attack derivation. Second, in Sections B.2 and B.3, we prove certain properties of derivations in the Horn theory model with XOR. Based on these properties we then reduce the security problem to the case without XOR, which by [14] is decidable. In the reduction we use the ability of principals to perform recursive computations in order to mimic operations involving XOR. The reduction is presented in Section B.4.
B.1 Simple Protocols
The goal of this subsection is to give a more compact and convenient characterization of an attack.
In the following, we write a protocol step with the protocol rule of the form t → q 1 (s 1 ), . . . , q n (s n ) and a send program Φ as a shortcut for the protocol step which consists of the protocol rule t → q 0 ( s 1 , . . . , s n ), where q 0 is a distinct predicate symbol, and the send program Φ with the additional rules q 0 ( x 1 , . . . , x n ) → q i (x i ), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 1.
A protocol P is simple, if both of the following condition are satisfied:
1. Each principal has exactly one protocol step (thus a protocol can be seen as a set of independent protocol steps). 2. Each protocol rule of R is of the form x → r(x), for some r ∈ R. Lemma 6. For each protocol P there exists a simple protocol P such that P is secure iff P is. Moreover, P can be computed in polynomial time w.r.t. the size of P .
Proof. First we show how to transform a principal Π into a set of independent protocol steps (more formally, into a set of principals each of who consists of one protocol step). We represent nodes of Π by sequences of natural numbers (elements of {0, . . . , k − 1} * , where k is the maximal branching degree of Π), in the usual way. For a node u of Π, let r u = {x 1 , . . . , x n } lu , where l u is a fresh key and x 1 , . . . , x n are the variables occurring in the protocol rules obtained when traversing from the root of Π to u. We transform Π into the following rules.
for each inner node u of Π {d} kv , r v , t → q(s), I (r u ) for each node u = vd of Π, where the label of the edge (v, u) consists of a rule t → q(s) with a send program Φ where, for each node u, we have a fresh key k u . In the case of the latter rule, we equip it with the original send program Φ. One can show that the protocol P obtained by replacing each participant Π by the set of protocol steps obtained in this way is secure if and only if P is secure. Now, to obtain a version of the protocol which meets Item 2 of Definition 1, we replace each protocol rule t → I (s) by the rule x → q(x), for some fresh predicate symbol q, and we add the rule q(t) ⇒ I (s) to the send program. Similarly, we replace each protocol rule t → r(s), for r ∈ Q, by rules x → q(x) and y → p(y), where q, p are fresh predicate symbols, and we extend the send program by the rules q(t) ⇒ I ({s} kr ) and p({z} kr ) ⇒ r(z). One can show that the protocol obtained in this way is secure if and only if P is secure.
One can also observe that the transformations described above are polynomial.
Lemma 6 allows us to consider only simple protocols without loss of generality. Furthermore, if simple protocols are considered, we can reformulate the notion of an attack in a simpler and more uniform way, as we do it below.
Let P be a simple protocol. We can assume that distinct protocol rules do not share variables. For a ground substitution θ, we define the theory P (θ):
where Φ is the union of all send programs occurring in P . Now, one can see that P is insecure if and only if there exists a substitution θ such that
In the remainder of this paper we will always assume that protocols are simple and we will use (17) as a characterization of an attack.
B.2 Modest and Normal Derivations
Recall that we call a term standard if its top-symbol is not ⊕; otherwise, it is called non-standard. For a simple protocol P , let S P denote the set containing the term 0 and all the ground subterms of terms occurring in P , and let C P be the set {t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n | t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ S P }. Like in the previous sections, elements of C P are referred to by c and decorations thereof. Non-standard terms will be written as c⊕t 1 ⊕· · ·⊕t n where c stands for a (ground) term in C P and t 1 , . . . , t n are standard terms not in C P . Without loss of generality we will assume that every nonstandard term c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n occurring in a derivation is in a normal form, i.e. the terms t 1 , . . . , t n are distinct. For a term t, we define F (t) as follows: F (c) = F (t) = F (c ⊕ t) = ∅, if c ∈ C P and t is a standard term not in C P , and F (c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n ) = {t 1 , . . . , t n }, for n > 1, where c ∈ C P and t 1 , . . . , t n are standard terms not in C P . Now, for a term t, let G(t) be defined by the equation G(t) = t ≤t F (t ) (where ≤ is the subterm ordering). A term is C P -long (or just long, if C P is known from the context) if it is of the form c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n , for n > 1. Otherwise it is called C P -short (or just short). One can see that a term t is long if and only if the set F (t) is not empty. If δ = a 1 , . . . , a n is a derivation, then δ(i) stands for a i . Moreover, δ <i stands for a 1 , . . . , a i−1 . For a derivation δ of length n, let G(δ) = n i=1 G(δ(i)). Lemma 7. Assume that δ is a derivation for (17). If δ(k) contains a term t as a subterm, then, for each t ∈ F (t), there exists c ∈ C P such that I (c ⊕ t ) occurs in δ <k .
Proof. If F (t) = ∅, it is nothing to prove. So, consider the case F (t) = ∅. We proceed by induction on k. Suppose that the lemma holds true for each i < k. We will show that it holds for k. If we assume that, for some i < k, a term t ∼ c ⊕ t occurs in δ(i), then we are trivially done (note that in this case F (t) = F (t )). Otherwise, δ(k) has to be I (t) and is obtained by the xor rule, i.e. t ∼ s ⊕ r, for some δ(i) = I (r) and δ(j) = I (s), for i, j < k (it is because the protocol is ⊕-linear and thus only the xor rule can introduce a term t with F (t) = ∅). Let t ∈ F (t). One can check that one of the following cases holds: (a) s is of the form c ⊕ t , (b) r is of the form c ⊕ t , (c) t ∈ F (s), or (d) t ∈ F (r). If (a) or (b) holds, we clearly have c ⊕ t ∈ δ <k . If (c) or (d) holds, we obtain c ⊕ t ∈ δ <k by the inductive hypothesis.
A derivation is modest if it uses the rules depicted in Figure 1 (on Page 9) instead of I (x), I (y) → I (x ⊕ y) where c, c 0 , . . . , c n ∈ C P and t, t , t 1 , . . . , t n are standard ground terms not in C P ; s and s are arbitrary ground terms. We observe that in a modest derivation long terms may only be used to obtain an element of C P , by applying rule (6) . In all other rules ( (7)- (10)), only short terms may be conjoined by XOR. However, (10) , which allows to combine an unbounded number of short terms, may produce a long term.
Lemma 8. If (17) holds, for some θ, then it has a modest derivation.
Proof. It is enough to show how to obtain z 0 = I (e⊕f ⊕t 1 ⊕· · ·⊕t k ⊕t n+1 ⊕· · ·⊕ t n+l ) from z 1 = I (e ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n ) and z 2 = I (f ⊕ t k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n+l ) in a modest derivation. By Lemma 7, we have previously derived I (c 1 ⊕t 1 ) , . . . , I (c n+l ⊕t n+l ). Thus, one can obtain I (c 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c n ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n ) and I (c k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c n+l ⊕ t k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n+l ), so, using z 1 and z 2 one can get I (e ⊕ c 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c n ) and I (f ⊕ c k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c n+l ), and so z 3 
, and I (c n+1 ⊕ t n+1 ), . . . , I (c n+l ⊕ t n+l ), we obtain z 0 .
A derivation δ is minimal, if δ(i) ∼ δ(j), for i = j. A derivation δ is said to be constant-closed, if for each i such that δ(i) is not of the form I (c), for c ∈ C P , if I (c), I (c ) ∈ δ <i , for c, c ∈ C P , then I (c ⊕ c ) ∈ δ <i (modulo ∼). For any derivation δ it is easy to obtain a minimal derivation δ just by removing repetitions. It is also easy to obtain a derivation which is constant-closed. Now, we group the rules of P (θ) into classes. If x → q(x) is a protocol rule of P , then a rule of P (θ) of the form I (xθ) ⇒ q(xθ) is called a protocol rule. We call Rules (9), (10) and the following standard intruder rules composition rules:
We call Rule (7) and the following standard intruder rules decomposition rules:
Rule (6) , then b i , b i+1 , . . . , b j for i ≤ j is a subsequence of the derivation. A segment of a derivation is a maximal subsequence which does not contain any element obtained by a protocol rule nor an element of the form I (c), for c ∈ C P . A derivation is normal, if (i) it is modest, minimal, and constant-closed, (ii) each segment consists of (a) push rules followed by (b) send rules followed by (c) decomposition rules followed by (d) variant rules followed by (e) composition rule. Note that the number of segments in a minimal derivation is at most exponential in the size of the protocol.
Lemma 9. If δ is a constant-closed derivation, then variant rules do not need to use as a premise an atom obtained from a variant rule or from a composition rule.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that some application of variant rule needs an element obtained by a composition or variant rule as a premise. Let us take the first such application. So, the obtained element is I (c 0 ⊕ t) and the premises are I (c 1 ⊕ t) and I (c 1 ), for some c 1 ∼ 0, with c 0 ∼ c 1 ⊕ c 1 . Now, we have two cases: Case 1 : I (c 1 ⊕ t) was obtained by a composition rule, which means that I (t) and I (c 1 ) were used to obtain it. But, since the derivation is constant-closed, we could use I (c 1 ⊕ c 1 ) and I (t) to obtain I (c 0 ⊕ t) by a composition rule. Case 2 : I (c 2 ⊕ t) and I (c 2 ) were used to obtain I (c 1 ⊕ t), for c 1 ∼ c 2 ⊕ c 2 . By our assumption, I (c 2 ⊕ t) is not obtained by the variant rule. But, because the derivation is constant-closed, we could use I (c 1 ⊕ c 2 ) and I (c 2 ⊕ t) to obtain I (c 0 ⊕ t) directly, which contradicts the assumption (note that c 2 ⊕ c 1 ⊕ c 2 ∼ c 0 ).
Lemma 10. If δ 0 is a modest derivation for (17), then there is a normal derivation δ for (17). Moreover
Proof. Suppose that δ 0 is a modest derivation for (17). As we mentioned earlier, it is easy to obtain a constant-closed and minimal version δ 1 of it. Note that G(δ 0 ) = G(δ 1 ). We will obtain a normal derivation δ by reordering the elements of each segment of δ 1 . One can easily see that this operation preserves the set G(δ).
First, we can observe that premises of (a) are not of the form I (t), so they cannot be a result of (b), (c), (d), nor (e). So we can place rules (a) in front of the remaining ones. For the similar reason, we can place rules (b) in front of (c), (d) and (e).
In order to show that results of (d) and (e) need not be used as premises of (c), we consider two cases. Case 1 : a term t is obtained from a term t by a standard decomposition rule. If t is obtained by (e) then t has to be known
To complete the proof, it is enough to note that, by Lemma 9, no conclusion of (e) is necessary as a premise of (d).
B.3 Profiles of Terms
Let t / ∈ C P be a standard term. Let δ be a derivation for (17). A compositionsegment in δ is a maximal subsequence of elements obtained by composition rules. A profile (w.r.t δ) of a term t is a pair (c, k), where c ∈ C P (note that 0 ∈ C P ) and i is a natural number such that:
, for some i, and there is no j < i such that δ(j) ∼ I (c ⊕ t), (ii) k is the number of composition-segments in δ <i . We define a set α(δ) as follows: t ∈ α(δ) iff the profile of t w.r.t. δ is α. Note that, if δ is a normal derivation, then the number of (nonempty) profiles is bounded exponentially in the size of the protocol.
Consider a derivation δ and a nonempty profile α(δ). We fix a term t δ α in the following way. If α = (0, k), then t δ α = 0. Otherwise let t δ α be a term which is minimal (w.r.t. the subterm ordering) in the set α(δ). Note that elements of α(δ) are standard terms. So, either t δ α = 0 (note that in this case t δ α is not necessarily an element of α(δ)) or it is a standard term from the set α(δ).
Lemma 11. Assume that δ is a normal derivation for (17). Let t ∈ α(δ). If δ(i) is obtained by a composition rule and I
Proof. We consider two cases: Case 1 : α = (0, k) and thus t δ α = 0. We have I (c ⊕ t) ∈ δ <i . Since (0, k) is the profile of t, the element I (t) cannot occur after I (c ⊕ t), so it occurs in δ <i too. Hence, from δ <i , we can derive c which is equivalent to c ⊕ t 
Recall that we have also I (c ⊕ t) ∈ δ <i . Hence, from δ <i , we can derive I (c ⊕ d) and then I (c ⊕ t δ α ). Now, for a derivation δ and a profile α, we define a function ∇ δ α from terms to terms by the following equations.
We can note that, because t 
. Proof. Let δ 0 be a normal derivation for I (0) P (θ) I (Sec). We will iteratively use Lemma 11 to obtain a derivation δ such that if δ(i) is obtained by a composition rule and I (c ⊕ t) ∈ δ <i , for some t ∈ α(δ), then I (c ⊕ t α ) ∈ δ <i : For each composition-segment, let us take the first element of it, denote it by δ(i). For each profile α such that I (c ⊕ t) ∈ δ <i , for some t ∈ α(δ), and I (c ⊕ t α ) / ∈ δ <i we insert the two elements given by Lemma 11 right before this compositionsegment. Note that this operation does not splits any composition-segment, so the profiles of terms remain the same (i.e. for each term t, we have t ∈ α(δ 0 ) iff
. We will show, by induction, that δ is a derivation for
We consider a few cases:
1. If δ(i) is obtained by some standard intruder rule, a protocol rule, or one of the Rules (7), (8), (9), then the proof is straightforward. 2. δ(i) is obtained by send rule. We have δ(i) ∼ I (tθ) and δ(j) ∼ q(sθ), for some j < i and some send rule q(s) t 1 ) , . . . ,I (c n ⊕ t n ). Without lost of generality we can assume that t i ∈ α(δ) iff i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, for some k. We have I (c 0 ) ∈ ∇ δ α (δ <i ) and
, for i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Because δ(i) is obtained by a composition rule and, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have t i ∈ α(δ) and
One can show that G(δ ) ⊆ {h δ α (t) | t ∈ G(δ)} (we do not have equality here, because some terms might have been canceled applying ∇ δ α ). However, δ may be not normal (it may not be minimal). So, we apply Lemma 10 to obtain a normal derivation δ * such that G(δ
A derivation δ is good, if it is modest, minimal, normal, and for each t, t ∈ G(δ) of the same profile α, we have t = t . Proof. Let δ 0 be a normal derivation for I (0) P (θ0) I (Sec), for some θ 0 . We will iteratively apply Lemma 14, obtaining δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . together with θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , such that δ i is a normal derivation for I (0) P (θi) I (Sec). We will do it as long as there are two distinct terms t, t ∈ G(δ i ) of the same profile α; in this case we obtain δ i+1 applying Lemma 14 for α.
Hence, after a finite number of steps we have to obtain a good derivation.
Corollary 2.
In a good derivation we have:
1. The number of distinct terms of the form c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n , for n > 1, is bounded by some M dependent on the size of a protocol. Moreover, for each such a term, n is bounded by some constant dependent of the size of the protocol. 2. The number of segments, and thus of blocks of elements obtained by variant rules, is bounded by some N dependent on the size of a protocol.
B.4 The Reduction
For each equivalence class [c] w.r.t. the xor equality, for c ∈ C P , we add a constant denoted by [c] to Σ. Let ≺ be a linear ordering relation on terms. As in the previous section, we assume that nonstandard terms are represented by expressions of the form c ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n or t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n , if c ∼ 0, where c ∈ C P and t 1 , . . . , t n / ∈ C P are standard. Now, we assume also that t 1 ≺ · · · ≺ t n .
[c]
Fig. 2. Definition of t
For a term t (possibly with variables), we define t in Figure 2 , where e is a fresh key. The rough idea of the reduction is as follows. For a ground term t, the term t , which does not contain ⊕, will serve as a canonical representation of the equivalence class of t (w.r.t. ∼). We will construct a protocol P + without ⊕ which is secure if and only if the original protocol P is. In particular, we will prove that whenever, in an attack θ on P , a term t can be derived, then it is possible to mimic this step in such a way that the term t can be derived in a corresponding attack on P + . We denote by Σ the signature of the original protocol P (containing, amongst the others, the ⊕ symbol and constants used in P ). By Σ we will denote the signature of P + which does not contain ⊕, but in addition, contains new constants (the constant e and the constants of the form [c]).
For a set of variables V , we define a set Θ(V ) of substitutions as follows: σ ∈ Θ V , if dom(σ) = V and, for each x ∈ V , we have σ(x) = x or σ(x) = c ⊕ x, for some c ∈ C P . Let P be a simple protocol. The definition of the protocol P + is given on Figure 3 . Rules (20) and (21) are intended to simulate Rule (6). Rule (22) is intended to simulate Rule (10) . Note that, by Corollary 2, it suffices to apply Rule (10) M times. Rules (23)-(25) are intended to simulate Rule (8) (note that, by Corollary 2, the number of blocks of element obtained by variant rule is bounded by N ). Finally, Rule (26) is intended to simulate send rules of the original protocol. We use here instances of the rules to be sure that terms in the canonical form can be obtained. One can prove the following fact.
Lemma 16. Let t be a ⊕-linear term over Σ and σ be a substitution over Σ such that, for each variable x, σ(x) is of the form s 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s n , for n ≥ 1, where s 1 , . . . , s n are standard terms not in C P . Then we have tθ = t θ Note that the protocol P + does not contain ⊕ and thus, by [14] , existence of an attack on P + is decidable. Hence, by the two following lemmas, existence of an attack on ⊕-linear protocols is also decidable.
We extend the protocol P by the following protocol steps (we omit send programs, if they are empty):
for c, c , c ∈ CP with c, c 
for i = 1, . . . , N , where z i is a fresh variable and p is a fresh predicate symbol.
To each send program Φ of P we add the rules
Fig. 3. Protocol P +
A pre-derivation is a sequence a 1 , . . . , a n such that a i can be derived from a 1 , . . . , a i−1 (in some number of steps). A pre-derivation can be seen as an incomplete derivation. One can easily see that if there is a pre-derivation, then there is also a derivation. We say that a (pre-) derivation is ⊕-free, if it does not use the XOR operator.
Lemma 17. If a ⊕-linear protocol P is insecure, then P + is insecure.
Proof. Assume that δ is a good derivation for I (0) P (θ) I (Sec), for some substitution θ. We split δ into δ 1δ1 · · · δ NδN such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,δ i is a (possibly empty) block of elements obtained by the variant rule, and no element in δ i is obtained by this rule. We define a substitution θ in the following way: For eachδ k we defineδ k in the following way:δ k contains the following elements: I (θ (z k )), then p(θ (z k )), and finally I ({ t i } [ci] ), for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, where t i and c i are terms given by definition of θ (z k ).
We will show that ρ = δ 1 δ 1 · · · δ N δ N is a ⊕-free pre-derivation for I (0) P + (θ ) I (Sec). So, we will show that each element ρ(i) of ρ can be derived in some number of steps from ρ <i . In case of the elements ofδ k , we note that, because I (c i ⊕t i ) ∈δ(k) is obtained by the variant rule from I (c i ⊕t) and I (c i ), so, by Lemma 9, we have I (c i ), I (c i ⊕ t) ∈ δ 1 · · · δ k and thus I ([c i ]) and I ({ t } [c i ] ) are in δ 1 · · · δ k , which suffices to derive I (θ (z i )). Further, p(θ (z k )) can be derived from I (θ (z k )) by (23). Now, I ({ t i } [ci] ), for i = 1, . . . , m, can be derived using (24)-(25). Now, consider an element ρ(k) = δ i (j) , for some i and j. Note that if a ∈δ i , then a ∈δ i . Note also that if a occurs in δ before δ i (j), then a ∈ ρ <k . We consider the following cases:
-If we assume that δ i (j) was obtained either by a standard intruder rule or by a push rule, then it is easy to check that δ i (j) can be easily derived (we use here (19) and (20)). -δ i (j) was obtained by a send rule. Hence, δ i (j) = I (sσ) was obtained from q(rσ), for some send rule q(r) → I (s). We have q( rσ ) ∈ ρ <k . One can check that there exists a substitution σ and a substitution κ ∈ Θ(dom(r)) such that σ = κσ and, for each variable x, σ (x) is of the form s 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s n , for n ≥ 1, where s 1 , . . . , s n are standard terms not in C P . Hence, by Lemma 16, we have q( rκ σ ) = q( rκσ ) = q( rσ ) ∈ ρ <k . So, we can derive I ( sκ σ ) = I ( sσ ) from ρ <k in one step by (26). -If δ i (j) was obtained by a protocol rule, i.e. δ i (j) = r(xθ) was obtained from I (xθ), for a protocol rule x → r(x), then we have I (xθ ) = I (xθ) ∈ ρ <k , by definition of θ , and so we can derive r(xθ ) = r( xθ ). -If δ i (j) was obtained by (9) or (7), then ρ(k) can be obtained by the standard push or pop rules. -δ i (j) = I (c⊕c ) was obtained from I(c⊕t 1 ⊕· · ·⊕t n ) and I (c ⊕t 1 ⊕· · ·⊕t n ) using (6) . So, we can derive I ({ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n } [c] ) and I ({ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n } [c ] ) from ρ <k (if c ∼ 0 then we have a = I ({ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n } [c] ) in ρ <k ; otherwise, I ( t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n ) ∈ ρ <k , and we can derive a by the encryption rule). Hence I ([c ⊕ c]) can be derived from ρ <k by Rule (21) or (20) (if n = 0). -δ i (j) = I (c 0 ⊕ c 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c n ⊕ t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t n ) is the k-th long term derived in δ and is obtained from I (c 0 ) and I (c 1 ⊕ t 1 ), . . . , I (c n ⊕ t n ), for some n > 1, using (10). Then we can obtain the element I ({ t 1 , . . . , t n } [c0⊕···⊕cn] ) by Rule (22). If c 0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ c n ∼ 0, then in an additional step we can obtain I ( t 1 , . . . , t n ).
We complete the proof of Theorem 3 by the following lemma which says, roughly speaking, that P + does not allow to derive more attacks than P does.
Lemma 18. Let P be a ⊕-linear protocol. If P + is insecure, then P is insecure.
Proof. For a term t we define t as follows.
[c] = c k = k t, s = t , s {|t| } k = {| t | } k
{t, s} e = t ⊕ s hash(t) = hash( t )
First, one can prove, by induction on the structure of terms, that, for each term t over Σ and each substitution σ over Σ , it holds t φ ∼ t φ ,
Now, let δ = a 1 , . . . , a n be a ⊕-free derivation for I (0) P + (θ) I (Sec). Let δ = a 1 , . . . , a n , where a i = I (0), if a i is of the form p(t) or p (t) (recall that p and p are fresh predicate symbols introduced in P + ) and a i = a i , otherwise. We will show that δ is a pre-derivation for I (0) P ( θ ) I (Sec). In order to do it, we show that δ (i) can be derived from δ <i in some number of steps. We consider a number of cases. If δ(i) is obtained either by some intruder rule, a protocol rule of P , a protocol rule introduced in P + , a push clause of P , or a push rule introduced in P + , then the proof is straightforward, so we omit it. Let us consider the remaining two cases: -δ(i) is obtained by a send clause (26). Hence, δ(i) is of the form I ( sκ σ) and is obtained from q( rκ σ), for some q(r) → I (s) ∈ Φ. So, we have δ <i q( rκ σ ) ∼ q(rκ σ ) (the last equivalence is by (27)). Thus, we can derive I (sκ σ ) which, by (27), is equivalent to I ( sκ σ). 
